

TOP SECRET

DEPUTIES' MEETING

DM-362

Monday, 27 December 1954

PRESENT: Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Messrs. Wisner, Amory, Colonel White, Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Helms, Bissell, Sheldon and [redacted]

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Mr. Dulles:

[redacted]

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b. Noted an article in the NEW YORK TIMES by Raymond on Yugoslavia, and asked Mr. Helms to query our people to find if this was an exclusive TIMES interview or a public announcement, and asked that the full text be secured if possible.

c. Noted Mr. Helms' paper on International Communism and asked that Mr. Bissell get together a group to discuss this paper as a matter of urgency. The Director suggested that Messrs. [redacted] and Angleton be included; Mr. Wisner suggested Mr. [redacted] and Mr. Amory suggested [redacted]. Mr. Kirkpatrick asked if the conclusions of the study might not be worthwhile information for the Clark Group and the Director stated that we might well want to go ahead with the study, but those portions with which the State Department was concerned might be appropriate for the Clark Group.

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d. Noted he would be out of town this afternoon and tomorrow morning, and asked Mr. Bissell to see [redacted] for him.

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e. Noted that [redacted] would arrive in Washington on 31 December 1954, but would not be in the office until 3 January 1955.

f. Commented on the Nelson Rockefeller briefing, asking Mr. Wisner to check with Mr. [redacted] on some notes he had, and also asked Mr. Wisner to get in touch with Mr. Rockefeller direct to determine when and where the briefing should be held.

g. Noted a letter from [redacted] commending us for certain security matters, and asked Colonel White to prepare a reply.

h. Asked if we could locate the "brainwashed" [redacted] and suggested we might want him as an exhibit for Mr. Hammarskjold. Mr. Helms undertook to do this.

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l. Noted he had had a visit from Admiral Smedberg. The Director took note of the information furnished by Admiral Smedberg regarding supplying Nationalist China with certain sea mines and said that the conversation was for information only and no action was required.

m. Mentioned that at a recent meeting of the NSC the Joint Chiefs had discussed the matter of ChiNat raids and indicated they would leave the matter up to us. Mr. Amory said he felt sure this did not reopen the transfer issue but what they really meant was that the Joint Chiefs would leave it up to us as to whether or not the raids were of intelligence value.

n. Mentioned he had discussed the Syrian problem with the Secretary of State and that he would need a briefing on this matter prior to the next NSC Meeting.

o. Asked General Cabell to come in Wednesday afternoon, possibly with [] and brief the Director on General Cabell's recent trip.

p. Asked Mr. Sheldon to follow up the wind-up of the [] case, checking to find out what term the prosecution will ask for. Mr. Kirkpatrick suggested that the [] case brought to light a fundamental weakness of our espionage laws. The Director stated that a letter to Mr. Brownell might suggest that the Clark Committee would be a good place to get something done in this connection.

Mr. Wisner:

Mr. Wisner [] situation poses a very big job for us. He said no action was necessary by the Director at this time.

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Mr. Amory:

a. Mentioned he was planning to attend the SEATO Conference and Mr. Wisner said that [] would represent DD/P. Mr. Wisner suggested that possibly a third person familiar with [] discussions might be sent along as a backstop.

b. Discussed [] memorandum on a Strategy Committee and suggested that as had been done in the past, we recommend that State head the Political Section, ORR head the Economic Section, and OSI have membership on the Scientific Section. In addition, Mr. Amory recommended that we attempt to place an ONE man on the Strategy Committee. Mr. Dulles approved.

c. Said that State Department now has the BW study.

Mr. Kirkpatrick:



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